ABSTRACT Internet application providers now have more incentive than ever to collect user data, which greatly increases the risk of user privacy violations due to the emerging of deep neural networks. In this paper, we propose TensorClog-a poisoning attack technique that is designed for privacy protection against deep neural networks. TensorClog has three properties with each of them serving a privacy protection purpose: 1) training on TensorClog poisoned data results in lower inference accuracy, reducing the incentive of abusive data collection; 2) training on TensorClog poisoned data converges to a larger loss, which prevents the neural network from learning the privacy; and 3) TensorClog regularizes the perturbation to remain a high structure similarity, so that the poisoning does not affect the actual content in the data. Applying our TensorClog poisoning technique to CIFAR-10 dataset results in an increase in both converged training loss and test error by 300% and 272%, respectively. It manages to maintain data's human perception with a high SSIM index of 0.9905. More experiments including different limited information attack scenarios and a real-world application transferred from pre-trained ImageNet models are presented to further evaluate TensorClog's effectiveness in more complex situations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, deep learning has enabled computational intelligence for a variety of applications, including image classification [1] , object detection [2] , speech recognition [3] , and game artificial intelligence [4] . With these successes in mind, data has become increasingly valuable, as larger training datasets generally result in enhanced generalization performance of deep neural networks.
Nowadays, popular internet applications generate huge amounts of data that may include sensitive user information, e.g. social media networks, search engines, online shopping, etc. Since there is little preventing the providers of these services to collect the data generated by user activity for improving their deep learning algorithms, it has raised concerns over the potential of user privacy violations. On the other hand, since the control of internet services and applications is highly concentrated to a few companies, users hardly have
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In the early days of internet when most content are in text form such as email and forum posts, some primitive methods for privacy protection has been used in practice. One common method that is still being used often is replacing the at symbol '@' in an email address with an other symbol to avoid marketing and spam emails. As simple as it looks like, this method carries two important properties: 1. The changed email address can still be recognized correctly by human users; 2. The changed email address cannot be recognized by email address crawlers. However, as the technology progresses, we now have more advanced network infrastructure to serve higher traffic loads and therefore images and videos have become the most consumed contents. The users urge for a practical method to conceal their private information in image and video forms without compromising the human perception, similarly to replacing symbol in text form.
To address this concern, one possible solution is intentional application of data poisoning, which is a kind of causative attack that degrades the performance and availability of the target machine learning model. In a data poisoning attack, an adversary creates an artificial correlation between inputs and labels by perturbing the inputs and/or modifying the labels. A machine learning algorithm trained on poisoned data will learn an incorrect feature correlation between inputs and labels and become less accurate for clean inputs. Due to this nature, it is especially suitable for use cases which require sourcing public data, since these data are accessible by the adversaries as well.
Many poisoning attacks have been identified for various machine learning algorithms, such as [5] for linear algorithms, [6] for principal component analysis and [7] for clustering. However, these methods do not apply well to modern deep neural networks, as unlike other machine learning algorithms which operate on pre-extracted features, deep neural networks operate directly on the original data itself. The end-to-end nature of deep learning requires a more discrete data poisoning attack, since perturbations applied directly to raw input samples are more noticeable to human observers. Furthermore, when applying data poisoning attack to usergenerated data, user-perceivable transformations to the data should be minimized as not to impact user experience. For these two reasons, using data poisoning attacks on deep neural networks for privacy concerns require an extra property beyond those previously considered -that being: remaining imperceptible to human observers.
For the purpose of privacy protection against deep neural networks technologies, we propose TensorClog, an imperceptible poisoning attack on deep learning applications. The attack is named as TensorClog because its attacking nature is based on clogging the back-propagation for gradient tensors during training process by minimizing the gradient norm. It focuses on generating human imperceptible perturbations by regularizing the perturbation. In addition, TensorClog also leverages characteristics of transfer learning to increase its usability. TensorClog has the following three attributions, each designed for a different need of privacy protection:
• Training on TensorClog poisoned data can cause the decrease of inference accuracy. This is designed to reduce the data's value for training deep neural network and thus reduce the incentive of abusive data collection.
• Training on TensorClog poisoned data results in larger converged loss. This is designed to prevent the network from learning the user privacy in the poisoned data when the data is collected regardless of its reduced value.
• TensorClog poisoned image maintains a high structure similarity to the clean image. This is designed for practical usability, as the poisoning process does not affect the perception of the original content. With these three properties, TensorClog has great potential for protecting user privacy in practice. Figure 1 shows a brief example of how it can preserve users' privacy against data collection from social medias for deep learning training without compromising user's perception of original data.
A series of detailed experiments on the standard CIFAR-10 dataset [8] are presented to demonstrate that TensorClog poisoned images can make transfer training converge to a 300% higher loss and get a 272% higher testing error rate while maintaining a high human visual similarity of SSIM In this paper, we use structure similarity (SSIM) index to quantitatively assess the change of human perception introduced by the poisoning attack. Since proposed in [9] , SSIM has been widely used to evaluate the similarity of two images for human visual system. Unlike other norm-based metrics that are commonly used in adversarial attack, SSIM is specifically designed to have a strong correlation with human perception. SSIM measures the distortion between two images by the three key factors: luminance distortion l(x, x ), contrast distortion c(x, x ) and loss of structure s(x, x ), as defined by following equation:
where x is the original clean image and x is the image with poisoning attack perturbation, and the three key factors are computed as follows:
where µ x denotes the mean of x, σ 2 x denotes the variance of x and σ xx is the cross-covariance of x and x . C 1 , C 2 and C 3 and three constants to avoid unexpected drastic change in value when the luminance and contrast are relatively low. Higher SSIM index means more similar two images are, with an upper bound of 1 when two images are identical. Conventionally, an SSIM index between 1∼0.98 represents high similarity, between 0.98∼0.96 means medium similarity and below 0.96 means low similarity [10] .
B. TRANSFER LEARNING FOR DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS
With the development of transfer learning technique [11] , nowadays few people choose to train a large scale deep neural network using random weight initialization, or in another word training from scratch. Instead, in most deep learning applications, people use a well-trained weight set for a similar task as their network initialization. Compared with training from scratch, this strategy addressed the following two concerns for training from scratch: (1) . Data insufficiency, as it is rare to have a sufficient dataset in practical cases; (2) . Computational cost, since it is much more computationally expensive to converge a random initialized network.
There are many different approaches of transfer learning for deep neural networks, and the two most widely used ones are [11] , [12] : (1) . Pre-trained model as feature extractor. In this strategy, the hidden layers of the pre-trained model are considered to represent feature extraction functions, while the last one or few fully connected layers are considered as linear classifier. It is assumed that the feature extractor part of the pre-trained model can be reused for the new task, as the two tasks have similar features. During transfer learning, the linear classifier part of the pre-trained model will be re-initialized and trained on the new task while the feature extractors part will be fixed.
(2). Feature fine-tuning. In this approach, the feature extractors part of the pre-trained model also joins the transfer learning in order to fine-tune more accurate feature extractors for the new task with a small learning rate than the linear classifier part.
C. POISONING ATTACK ON DEEP LEARNING
Poisoning attack is a typical security threat in which the attack happens during training. Despite for the abundant attack schemes on other machine learning based algorithms as mentioned in Section Introduction, satisfying poisoning attack technique on deep learning applications is still lacking. The two main reasons that prevents us from transferring the current poisoning attack schemes on other machine learning algorithms to deep learning are: (1) . The end-to-end nature of deep learning poses the extra demand of human invisibility and (2). The difficulty for calculating derivatives of multiple error classes, as previous work focuses on two-class applications and the loss function of other learning algorithms are not as computational expensive.
For poisoning attack on deep learning applications, there are some pre-existing studies but none of them was design for the purpose of privacy protection. Reference [13] proposed a method towards poisoning attack on deep learning algorithms with back-gradient optimization technique. However, it failed to yield significant attack result on a subtask of MNIST. Reference [14] proposed a method to generate poisoning samples with Generative Adversarial Nets, but it focuses on generating poisoning attack effectiveness without limiting the perturbation thus resulting human noticeable attack samples. Reference [15] proposed a poisoning scheme for deep learning that would maintain human perception for the poisoned data. However, it causes the target model to yield wrong classification result with strong confidence for the poisoned data. This process does not work for the purpose of privacy protection, since the model still learns the feature from the poisoned data.
In addition, countermeasures of poisoning attack has also been proposed [16] , [17] , which aim to detect and filter out poisoned data. However, if a poisoned data is detected by a defend system and filtered out of the training set, privacy protection purpose is already realized, and therefore they do not apply for this setting.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. THREAT MODEL
Although in theory TensorClog would work for any supervised training schemes for deep neural networks, the computation becomes impractically expensive as the trainable parameters and layers of the network increase. However, as the network grows deeper, people seldom train deep neural networks from scratch since this process can take days if not weeks. In practice, transfer learning is more commonly used, in which the parameters for the hidden layers are imported from another pre-trained model on a similar dataset and fixed. Then only the parameters in the last or last few fully connected layers are re-initialized and retrained. By proper deployment, transfer learning can reduce training time significantly without compromising accuracy. Based on these facts, attack on transfer learning is the main focus of this paper. The attack schemes mentioned in the rest of paper refer to this threat model if without specific notation.
B. LIMITED INFORMATION ATTACK SCENARIOS
The effectiveness of TensorClog may vary based on the adversary's accessibility of target model's information. With less information exposed to the adversary, the effectiveness of the attack drops while the practicality increases. The key information that affects the effectiveness of TensorClog are: (1) Input-output pairs; (2) . Model architecture; (3). Pretrained weights. (4) . Initialize function for the trainable layer; (5) . Initialized value of the trainable layer. The five information are listed in a decreasing order of impact on the attack effectiveness and also in an increasing order of difficulty for access. Different attack scenarios are defined by the different degree of target model information exposed to the adversary.
In a white-box attack scenario, the adversary has the access to all the five aforementioned information, while in blackbox attack scenarios, the level of the black-box increases as less information the adversary gets access to. We assume that the adversary can always have the access to the input-output pairs. It is a reasonable assumption since the adversary can easily get this information by disguising as a regular user and sending queries to the target model [18] . The definition of attack scenarios can be found in Table 1 .
IV. METHOD
Inspired by the gradient vanishing problem for gradient decent based training methods, we propose a poisoning attack namely TensorClog. It can reduce data's training effectiveness by minimizing the partial derivative of the loss function w.r.t. weights and therefore intentionally causing gradient vanishing. In addition, TensorClog regularizes the distance between adversarial samples and clean samples, and then controls the maximum elemental perturbation for minimum effect on human perception.
A. ANNOTATIONS
In the rest of this section, following definition of annotations will be used:
x, y: The input tensor and the target tensor. w: The set of all trainable weights in a neural network. w l : The weights of the l th trainable layer. f (x, w): The analytic expression of a neural network. L f (x, w), y : The loss function of the neural network.
B. MINIMIZING GRADIENT
For most gradient decent based training algorithms, the weight update of each training iteration has a positive correlation to the weight gradient dw, which can be computed by the following equation:
Therefore, by minimizing the L 2 -norm of dw, weight update of each training iteration will be closer to zero tensor O. With close to O weight update on very iteration, we managed to deliberately create gradient vanish problem, effectively making the training process harder to converge. Therefore, the loss function for TensorClog attack L T can be written as:
Here the square operation and the factor of 
The TensorClog loss L T is differentiable w.r.t. input x as the differential process is shown as follows:
Since dx is differentiable, we can use gradient decent based optimization algorithms on L T w.r.t. input x to minimize the weight gradient dw, similarly to how we minimize neural network's loss function L.
Because of the second-order derivative operation introduced by ∇ x dw l in Equation 6 , it is very computational expensive to compute. However, as aforementioned in the Preliminaries section, this attack is mainly for transfer learning. In this case, the number of total trainable layers n is relatively small, and this will reduce the computation cost by having less elements in the . In addition, these trainable layers are the last few layers in the neural network, the partial derivative is less computational expensive since less backpropagation operations are needed.
C. REGULARIZING PERTURBATION
In order to reduce the effect on human perception introduced by the perturbation, we use regularization on perturbation to encourage the optimization to find perturbation with smaller distance. More specifically, we use the square of L 2 -distance rather than L 1 -distance for the reason that the square of L 2 -distance is always differentiable while L 1 -distance is not differentiable at O. The perturbation regularization R p can be represented as:
Here x denotes the poisoned sample, λ is the strength of the regularization.
However, L 2 -distance of the perturbation does not always correlate well with the change of human perception. An example is shown in Figure 2 to demonstrate this observation. Here in Figure 2 , (1) is the original image, (2) is the original image with center cropped, (3) is the original image with a uniform deviation on all pixels and (4) is the original image with a uniform deviation on red channel only. Image (2), (3) and (4) all have the same L 2 -distance from image (1). However, the L 1 -distance of the most perturbed element for image (2) , (3) and (4) To address this problem, an intuitive solution would be using the SSIM index instead of L 2 -distance. However, as shown in equation 2, the calculation of SSIM index includes division, which makes its differentiation too computational expensive to be used as a part of optimization target. In practice, we find that using L ∞ distance as a supplementary target to L 2 -distance to be effective and efficient. We control the L ∞ norm of the perturbation by limiting the maximum perturbation allowed on each individual element. The following clamping operation is used for this purpose:
Here T denotes a tensor with the same shape as x and all of its elements equal to 1. It is worth noting that in this subsection there are two hyper-parameters introduced. They are the regularization strength λ and the maximum elemental perturbation respectively.
D. ATTACK STRATEGIES FOR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS

With Equation 4 and Equation 7
, we now have the combined loss function for TensorClog attack: As proven in previous subsections, the TensorClog attack loss function is differentiable w.r.t. to x, so we can use similar gradient decent based optimization algorithms to minimize it. The optimizers that are widely used to minimize the loss function in deep neural network's training process can be directly adopted here, for example Stochastic Gradient Decent, Adam, RMS-Prop and etc. The learning rate η, as the most important hyper-parameter of these optimizers during training, is called attack optimization rate for TensorClog.
First, we assume the adversary has all the information of the target model, which is defined as a white-box attack in the Preliminaries Section. The attack strategy for the white-box attack is shown in Algorithm 1.
However, for the black-box attack scenarios, the adversary has the access to the input/output pairs and some information of the target model. The strategy for black-box attack is as follows [18] : (1) . Reconstruct a similar model as the target model; (2) . Generate the poisoned sample on the reconstructed model following the white-box attack process in Algorithm 1; (3). Transfer the generated poisoned sample to the target model.
It is worth noting that the complete version of TensorClog attack has several hyper-parameters that need to be manually tuned. The detailed description of these hyper-parameters is listed in Table 2 . We will elaborate how each hyperparameter contributes to TensorClog attack in the Experiment section.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we elaborate the experiments we have conducted and explain the TensorClog attack in an empirical way. Firstly, the effectiveness of the TensorClog attack on transfer learning is shown on CIFAR-10 dataset. Then more experiments are presented to explain how the hyper-parameters affect the TensorClog attack. In addition, we examined TensorClog under different attack scenarios. Finally, an attack on a real-world transfer learning application is presented to evaluate TensorClog usability in real-world complicated dataset rather than only on standard datasets.
A. EFFECTIVENESS OF TensorClog
In this subsection, an artificial transfer learning setting is created on the CIFAR-10 dataset, following the same idea of [11] . The 50,000 training images with 10 classes in the dataset are divided into two groups, whereas the first group contains the images of the 5 labels random labels and the second group contains the images of the rest 5 labels. The validation set is also divided with the same rule. The pre-trained model is trained on the first group and the transfer learning is trained on the second group. We also refer to the second group as the transfer training set. During the transfer learning process, only the last linear classifier is re-initialized and retrained while the other layers are fixed.
A ResNet-18 [19] network is trained on three transfer training sets using the artificial transfer training setting. During the training procedure, the training rate decays by the factor of 0.1 after every 20 epochs. Softmax loss and Stochastic Gradient Decent with momentum are used for the training. The three transfer training sets are: (1) . The clean images of the original transfer training set; (2). The TensorClog poisoned images with hyper-parameters of λ = 0.01, = 0.1, η = 1, iter_max = 100; (3). The clean images with Gaussian noise applied, the Gaussian noise has the same mean and deviation as the TensorClog perturbation. Figure 3(a) shows the transfer training loss and test error difference on the three transfer training set. We can see from the figure that the training loss for the TensorClog poisoned images converges to 1.84. even after the learning rate decay. Note that this is actually a significant loss, since for a 10-class task like CIFAR-10, a dummy classifier which does only random guesses would have a softmax loss of −ln(
The test error of the classifier also increases from 13.97% to 51.93%, making the classifier unusable.
In addition, to prove that TensorClog attack is not just a random noise, the training loss on transfer training set with Gaussian noise is also shown in the figure. we can see that applying Gaussian noise with same mean and deviation as TensorClog attack will not introduce any noticeable degradation for the training loss. to their original clean images. Detailed quantitative results of this experiment can be found in Table 3 .
B. HYPER-PARAMETERS OF TensorClog
In this subsection, a series of experiments using the same artificial transfer learning setting as the previous subsection are presented to demonstrate how each hyper-parameter contributes to the TensorClog attack.
The hyper-parameters of regularization strength λ and maximum elemental perturbation work in a similar way as they both contribute to limiting the perturbation. Four groups of experiments are shown in Table 4 . The first group uses the exactly same attack settings as in the previous subsection. The second group eliminates the clamping operation while the third group removed the regularization. None of regularization and clamping are used for group four.
From this table we can see that the clamping operation helps preserve human perception by limiting the maximum perturbed pixel. Both two experiments group that uses clamping yields imperceptible perturbations. Although the other two that does not use clamping generate smaller mean L 2 -distance and cause higher training loss, they become less usable as they introduce too much change to human perception. The visualized result of five most perturbed images from experiment group 4 can be found in Figure 4 . This observation conforms to our assumption that limiting maximum elemental perturbation is essential for human perception preserving, which is proposed in Figure 2 . In addition, we can see that L 2 -regularization further helps to reduce both mean L 2 -distance and mean gradient, which results in a higher converged loss for transfer learning.
The other two hyper-parameters η and iter_max are introduced by the optimization algorithm. They work in a similar manner as they do for optimizing loss functions during deep neural networks' training. The optimization rate η is highly case dependent in the same manner as learning rate is. The maximum iteration number iter_max linearly determines how fast the poison images are generated. As a reference, our implementation with Stochastic Gradient Decent optimizer managed to finish 100 iterations for one CIFAR-10 image in 1.38 seconds on a GTX 1080 Ti.
C. TensorClog IN DIFFERENT ATTACK SCENARIOS
White-box attack is a rather ideal attack scenario. In reality, it is unlikely for the adversary to have the access to all the information of target model. Therefore, different levels of black-box attacks proposed in Table 1 are studied in this subsection.
We use the same artificial transfer learning setting in previous section as a baseline white-box attack, and then gradually reduce the information exposed to the adversary to form different levels of black-box attacks. In the baseline whitebox attack, a ResNet-18 network is pre-trained. Before the transfer learning process, its last linear layer is re-initialized using Xavier uniform initializer [20] .
The four levels of black-box attacks are composed as follows: Level 1: the linear layer is re-initialized using a different random seed; Level 2: the linear layer is re-initialized using He uniform [19] instead of Xavier uniform; Level 3: the TensorClog poisoning is generated on another ResNet-18 network with different pre-trained weights; Level 4: the TensorClog poisoning is generated on a VGG-16 [21] network while the target model is a ResNet-18 network. The choose of hyper-parameters are all the same for these scenarios. The result can be found in Table 5 .
We can see from the table that the result of TensorClog remains almost intact for black-box attack Level 1 and Level 2 comparing with white-box attack. However, there are noticeable effectiveness drop for black-box attack Level 3 and Level 4. Although TensorClog manages to increase converged loss for Level 3 and Level 4, the degradation on test accuracy is not satisfying, as in Level 4 the accuracy drop is less than 2%.
The results show that knowing the re-initialized value and the initialization function are not important for TensorClog attack, since both black-box attack Level 1 and Level 2 have attack effectiveness close to white-box attack. The information of pre-trained weights is important for TensorClog attack, as we see from the attack effectiveness degradation of black-box attack Level 3. However, even with the knowledge of model structure only, the adversary can still launch a usable attack introducing more than 90% more training loss and more than 25% test error.
D. TensorClog FOR REAL-WORLD APPLICATION
We use the dataset from iMaterialist Challenge (Furniture) at FGVC5 competition featured by Kaggle as a real-world application example. It is chosen because it is an ideal example We resize all the images in the dataset to 224×224. A PyTorch [23] built-in pre-trained ResNet-152 network is used as the target model. Since the number of transfer training set is larger than previous experiments (194,828 vs 10,000), we reduce the iteration number from 100 to 20 for faster generation of poisoned images. The experiment result can be found in Figure 5 .
We can see from Figure 5 (a) that TensorClog is able to increase training loss from 1.6085 to 2.6623 and test error from 0.355 to 0.769. Similar to the results on CIFAR-10 dataset, the transfer training converges to a higher loss and test accuracy degrades to a unusable degree. Figure 5 (b) and Figure 5 (c) visualize the three most perturbed images with the largest L 2 -distance. Our most perturbed image has a 0.9890 SSIM index to its original image, which denotes imperceptible perturbation.
The experiment in this subsection shows that TensorClog's performance on real-world datasets and applications accords with the experiment results on our artificial transfer learning settings in previous subsections.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a poisoning attack technique namely TensorClog is introduced. It is designed for privacy protection purpose, with the capability of generating poisoned samples without affecting human perception while causing transfer training of deep neural networks converge to a higher loss and result in a worse test accuracy. With the above features, TensorClog can be used in practice to protect user privacy. A representative example would a smart-phone gallery app with TensorClog poisoning baked in, and it automatically poisons the image or video whenever the user tries to share it via social media or back it up on cloud servers. Several experiments are presented to prove TensorClog's effectiveness and to elaborate the its design mentality. Also, experiments in different black-box settings are presented, showing its practicality with limited knowledge of the target deep neural network model. At last, an attack example on a real-world dataset is presented, further showing the possibility of using TensorClog poisoning in privacy preserving for user data. 
